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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
~fABEL A. BENCH, 
Plaintiff and AppcllcintJ 
vs. 
THE EQUITABLE LIFE ASSUR-
ANCE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED 
STATES, a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
11105 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a suit brought to recover on certain policies 
of life insurance and by amendments to the complaint, 
to recover on certain policies of disability and hospital-
ization insurance. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
At the pretrial hearing the court entered an order 
S8tting forth the respondent's defense that, as a matter 
of law, coverage under Policy 5311848 lapsed on the 
thirty-first day following termination from employment 
1 
and directed respondent to file a motion for summary 
judgment so that the Law and Motion Division of th~ 
court might rule on the validity of this defensP. The 
pretrial judge expressly declined to rule on such de-
fense which was set forth in the pleadings and was 
raised at the pretrial hearing. The pretrial court gave 
the appellant leave to amend her complaint to allege a 
cause of action on two additional policies, one being a 
policy providing medical and surgical benefits and tlw 
other, a disability policy. 
Pursuant to such leave of the pretrial court, the 
appellant elected to file an amended complaint, setting 
forth the two causes of action alleged in the original 
complaint, the two causes of action on the above-men-
tioned policies and a catch-all provision wherein liability 
is alleged on "any other insurance or benefit policies." 
In accordance with the direction of the pretrial 
judge, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the amended 
complaint, which motion was granted. The Law and Mo-
tion Division of the lower court dismissed the complaint 
without prejudice. Thereafter, appellant filed a second 
amended complaint and on the same day, submitted inter-
rogatories to the respondent. The second amended com-
plaint, aside from an allegation that ''all reqnired notice 
of death and the plaintiff's claim was given to the de-
fendant, and all condition precedent to plaintiff's de-
mands and to defendant's liability to plaintiff duly per-
formed," is not materially different from the amended 
complaint. A second motion to dismiss was filed and 
upon hearing, the Law and Motion Division of the lower 
2 
conrt granted the motion to dismiss and said dismissal 
was entered ·with prejudice. Because of the order of 
dismissal, the interrogatories referred to above were 
not answered. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Affirmance of the order of dismissal of the lower 
court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The original complaint as well as the amended and 
second amended complaints allege that the appellant is 
the surviving widow of Leland E. Bench and that the 
said Leland E. Bench died on July 1, 1963. The com-
plaints also allege that the said Leland E. Bench was 
terminated from employment by Ajax Press Company 
on April 26, 1963. The original complaint sought re-
covery on "a group life insurance policy." (R-1) 
By answer, the respondent set forth the numbers 
of two group life insurance policies as well as pertinent 
provisions thereof and subsequently furnished recon-
structed copies of such policies to the appellant's attor-
ney. 
On the question of the decedent's disability, it ap-
pears from the appellant's deposition that he suffered 
an injury while on the job. "He had bumped his left 
h·g on a piece of pipe or something they had worked 
on down there." (Page 4 of appellant's deposition.) This 
"hump" according to appellant's deposition caused him 
to han an infection and completely incapacitated him. 
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r:l'he '"bump" i8 also described as 2% inches long and 
"it looks like it would be about between a half inch or 
three-quarter8 of an inch deep, 8omething like that. It 
was t1uite deep." (Appellant'8 depo8ition, Page 18.) 
Appellant fnrtlwr testified in her depo8ition that thl· 
leg was bleeding at the time her lnrnband came hoirn· 
from 'Nork, that she put clean bandages on it, but that 
her husband did not see a doctor. This injury occurred 
on Monday and her husband returned to \rnrk the follow-
ing Friday, April 2G, 1963. On that day, his employment 
was terminated. 'rhe appellant's deposition continues to 
the effect that for another week, her husband, the de-
cedent, was totally disahlPd and remained bedridden until 
he was admitted to the County Hospital as an out-patient 
on either the 2nd or 5th of .May, 1963. From the initial 
visit at the County Hospital until the Thursday before 
the first of .July, the decedent was treated on an out-
patient basis, initially every week, and subsequently, 
every two weeks. On the Thursday before July 1, 1963, 
the insured was admitted as a patient at the hospital 
and died on July 1, 1963. 
It was only with the filing of the amended complaint 
that respondent was apprised that the appellant was 
claiming anything by virtue of the hospital-medical pol-
icy or the disability policy. Appellant endeavors to make 
much of the fact that the respondent refused to divulge 
the existence of these latter policies. As will appPar in 
the Argument hereafter, respondent had no reason to 
helievP that sn<'h polieies were pertinent or had any bear-
ing on the matters sd forth in the complaint. 
4 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IN CONSIDERING THE MOTION TO DISMISS, THE 
LAW AND MOTION DIVISION FOLLOWED THE 
PRETRIAL ORDER. 
Appellant's argument on Point I proceeds from a 
false premises: That the Law and Motion Division ig-
nored the pretrial order. Respondent respectfully sub-
mits that the pretrial order speaks for itself and con-
stitutes simply a delineation of the issues by the pretrial 
judge as such issues were reflected by the pleadings 
lwfore the pretrial court. As revealed by the pretrial 
order itself, the judge declined to pass on questions 
of law and took the position that it was incumbent on 
the parties to "exhaust the remedy" of a motion for 
summary judgment before the Law and Motion Division. 
In ruling on the motion to dismiss, the Law and 
Motion Division of the lower court did not ignore the 
pretrial order since the pretrial order did not purport 
to pass upon any questions of law or fact but merely 
sd forth the issues as they appeared from the pleadings 
which were then on file. 
POINT II 
DISMISSAL OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
WAS PROPER AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
The appellant combines the arguments against dis-
missal of the various counts of the second amended 
complaint. Respondent submits that since each count of 
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the complaint presents differing legal or factual ques-
tions, the arguments may more prorwrly be made und('r 
separate headings. 
Policy Number 5311848 is the group life insurance 
policy referred to in the First Cause of Action. The 
appellant quotes a portion of the language from this 
policy and we respectfully ref er the Court to the policy 
itself for the full language thereof with respect to con-
versions and, also, terminations. This language appears 
on the white photostatic copy page~, the page bearing a 
penned number 9 in the lower right-hand corner. 
There is no dispute as to the fact of termination 
of employment. The appellant has alleged in three com-
plaints that the decedent was terminated from employ-
ment and testified in her deposition that the deceased 
received a blue slip and was terminated from employ-
ment. There is no question that the insured died more 
than thirty-one (31) days following termination from 
employment. We respectfully submit that the contract 
i8 unambiguous and clear. As a matter of law, it must 
be held that all insurance coverage under Policy 5311848 
had ceased and terminated at the date of insured's death. 
The appellant cites cases dealing with extension pro-
visions and termination rights and the respondent does 
not quarrel with the rules of law laid down in such 
cases. The case of Powell vs. Equitable Life Assurancr 
Society, 173 S. C. 50, 174 S.E. 649, involves a question 
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of temporary lay-offs. 'l'he p1incipal issue in that case 
was whether the insured was still employed at the date 
of her death or whether she was on a temporary lay-off. 
In l<Jqititable Life Assura11ce Society vs. lloovcr, 
1~7 Okla. 134, 101 P.2d 632, the death of the employee 
occurred during the thirty-one day period for conversion 
of the policy to other insurance. That policy, differing 
from the one here invoked, did not expressly provide 
tliat coverage ceased on the thirty-first day following 
termination. The court simply held that during the thirty-
one day conversion period, there was an extension of 
coverage. No doubt, the respondent here who was the 
defendant in the Hoover case drafted Policy Number 
5311848 with the decision of that case in mind since the 
extension expressly coincides with the conversion period. 
Likewise the case of Atlas Life lnsitrance Company 
rs. Miles, 195 Okla. 645, 161 P.2d 1022, involves a situa-
tion where the insured died during the conversion period. 
On the authority of the Hoover case, the result was the 
same. 
Also, in the case of Shanks vs. Travelers Insurance 
Co111pany, (Okl. D.C.), 25 F.Snpp. 740, the situation in-
YolvPd a death during the thirty-one day conversion per-
iod. In the Shanks case, the employee died the day 
following her termination from employment and the 
eomt held, as in the previous cases, that the thirty-one 
day conversion period effected an extension of coverage. 
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The case of Stunner vs. Travelers lnsurcincc Com-
pany, 279 Illinois App. G07, is a situation where the sole 
issue was whether the decedent had bPen temporarily 
laid off or whether he was terminated from employment. 
In argument following the citation of this case, appel-
lant is apparently contending for the first time that there 
is a quesion in this case whether the decedent was termin-
ated from employment. This, notwithstanding the alle-
gation of termination contained in three complaints and 
appellant's testimony in her deposition as to termination 
of employment. We respectfully urge that this case 
must be confined to the record before the Court. 'rl1ere 
is no issue on the question of whether Leland Bench 
was terminated from employment. It has been so alleged 
and the allegation is admitted. 
We would make the same comment with respect to 
the case of Travelers Insurance Company vs. Fox, 155 
l\Id. 210, 141 Atl. 547, which is cited by appellant. Such, 
also, is the burden of the case of Peters vs. Aetna Life 
Insurance Company, 279 Mich. 663, 273 N.W. 307. It 
should be pointed out that all of these cases involve 
a factual question as to whether decedent was laid off 
temporarily or was terminated, and the death occurred 
within a period of not less than thirty-one days. 
As appears from the foregoing review, the cases 
cited by appellant fall into two categories. One group 
of cases holds that where there is a (1uestion as to 
whether the insured was terminatt>d from Pmployment, 
there is a question of fact, and some of the cases hold 
8 
that tlw bnrd0n of proving a termination i8 on the immr-
anr,e company. Tlwre i8 no snch factual question in this 
case. 
The other group of cases holds that there i8 insur-
ance coverage during a thirty-one day convPrsion period 
provided hy the policy. 'l'hat is not denied in this ca::;e 
since the policy itself expressly provides that the insur-
ance shall n~main in force for thirty-one days following 
the employee's termination. 
\Ve note the interesting argument advanced by appel-
lant that since there is a thirty-one day period within 
which to convert the policy to permanent insurance and 
the policy is in force during that period by express pro-
visions, a reasonable time should be allowed thereafter. 
No cases are cited in support of such a novel contention 
and in view of the express provisions of the policy, we 
submit that no such cases exist. V\T e also note the pro-
posed inforence that the decedent '.vould have exercised 
this converson privilege had he been notified thereof or 
had knowledge of the same. Regarding the matter of the 
decedent's knowledge of coverage, the appellant, in her 
deposition, states that she had a certificate of life insur-
ance. (Appellant's deposition, Page 16). It would be 
immaterial whether the certificate in appellant's posses-
:o-:ion "'as on Polic:v fl31184S or 0486, since both certificates 
sPt forth substantially identical conversion privileges. 
POINT III 
DISMISSAL OF THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
WAS PROPER. THERE WAS NO ISSUE OF FACT 
ON WHICH REASONABLE MINDS MIGHT DIFFER. 
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The Second Cause of Action involvt·s Policy Numbl•r 
0486A and we respectfully refer the Court to the copy 
of the policy produced, the page with the notation in 
the right-hand corner, number 27, which contains an t'X-
tended death benefit. The provision states that: 
"If due proof of the death of an t>mployeP 
shall be submitted in writing to the Society within 
one (1) year after the death of such employee 
whose insurance hereunder shall have terminated 
due to termination of employment in accordance 
with the provisions hereof entitled 'Individual 
Terminations,' the Society will pay to the person 
or persons entitled thereto under the provisions 
of this policy the amount of the insurance for 
which such employee's life was last insured under 
this policy, provided due proof shall be furnished 
to the Society that * * *. At the date of such 
termination of employment, such employee was 
totally disabled by bodily injury or disease so 
as to be prevented from engaging in any occu-
pation for compensation or profit and that such 
total disability continued from such termination 
of employment to such death * * *." 
The ommitted provisions of the extended death bene-
fit clause are not applicable to the instant case. 
Looking now to the evidence before the trial court 
regarding disability, we refer to appellant's deposition, 
Page 4, Line 11, 
"Q. What was Mr. Bench's state of health at that 
time~ 
"A. He bumped his left leg on a piece of pipn 
or something they had worked on down there. 
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"Q. That ·would be on the joM 
"A. On the job. 
"Q. ·what wa~ ·t1w affrct of the hump? 
"A. It caused him to ham infection. It was m-
flamed. 
"Q. When did this accident occur? How long be-
fore his termination~ 
"A. Monday before termination. 
"Q. Do you know whether Mr. Bench made a re-
port of this occurrence to anyone at Ajax 
Presses? 
"A. Yes, he made a report to the - what do you 
call them - it was something to do with your 
health and accident, something like that. 
"Q. Do yon know the name of the-? You don't 
know the name of the individual, do you? 
"A. I can't think of it. 
"Q. Would it be Mr. Blake, the personnel mana-
ger1 
"A. No, it was not Mr. Blake. It was the one 
for the -. 
"Q. It would be the - some person who had to 
deal with safety. 
"A. It is some person they had to deal with safety 
-yes. 
"Q. Safety or first-aid measures~ 
"A. Yes. 
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"Q. Did Ajax PrPsses ban a company doctor for 
the employees? 
"A. Dr. Burnham. 
"Q. Dr. Burnham. Did your husband consult Dr. 
Burnham after his accident 1 
"A. After he got the blue slip, he wasn't entitled 
to. 
"Q. Did he consult Dr. Burnham af er the acc1-
denU 
"A. No. He got the blue slip. 
"Q. Do you know the day of the week the blue 
slip was given to him 1 
"A. Friday. 
"Q. So that the accident occurred on Monday but 
you didn't consult Dr. Burnham between that 
time and the end of the week? 
"A. No. He couldn't get an appointment. 
"Q. Did he work the rest of the week? From Mon-
day until Friday? 
"A. No, he did not. 
"Q. What was the condition of Mr. Bench's leg 
that this bump would cause such difficulty, 
Mrs. Bench? 
"A. Just started infected and blood poison." 
Giving further details of the nature and extent of the 
injury on Page 7, Line 6, 
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"Q. Did he show you a bruise or cut on his leg1 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. Did yon see his leg~ 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. ·was there a cut there? 
"A. There was a cut. 
"Q. First of all, which leg was it on, Mrs. Bench? 
"A. The left leg. 
"Q. His left leg~ 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. About where on the left leg, Mrs. Bench~ 
"A. Just a little west - left of his shin bone. 
"Q. How high up on the leg from the ankle would 
it be~ 
"A. About where you have your hand. Would 
that be, say, a foot from the floor~ My judg-
ment of measurements that way is no good." 
Apparently, appellant is somewhat confused about 
the activities of her deceased husband following the in-
jury since at Page 12, Line 30: 
"Q. I may have asked you this before, Mrs. Bench, 
but I am not certain of it: Between the time 
of the accident which took place on Monday, 
April 26, which you say was a Friday, did 
your husband work continuously his regular 
shift at Ajax~ 
"A. Oh, yes. 
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''Q. 
"A. 
But yon an' not sm·p wlwt11Pr it was durin" . /"") 
that iwriod or after tlw tPrmination that this 
man called to talk to you about tlw accident 
or called on yonr husband? 
No, I don't. Mr. Bench showt>d him his lPg 
and he said it was an awfully nasty looking 
leg." 
On cross-Pxamination, appellant wPnt into consider-
able more detail regarding the Pxtent and natnre of 
the injnry, stating at Page 18: 
''lt is about two and a half inches long. It 
looks like it would be between a half-inch or 
three-quarters of an inch deep, something like 
that. It was cut quite deep. 
"Q. Through the skin? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Had he had it dressed at that time? 
"A. No. 
"Q. Any bandage over it? 
"A. No. He came right home. 
"Q. It was bleeding." 
Continuing on Page 19, Line 5, 
"Q. Did he got to work the following day1 
"A. No, sir. 
"Q. When did he m~xt go to the plant? 
"A. The following Friday. 
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''Q. What time did he leave then~ 
"A. He left at 6 :30 in the morning to get down 
there at 7 :00 a.m. 
''Q. What time was he back? 
"A. Back about - not - about 8 :30. 
"Q. The reason for his not going to work between 
those times - Monday and Friday - was 
what1 
"A. He injured his leg. 
"Q. When he went to the plant on Friday, did 
he go back to work or something else~ 
"A. He went back to go to work even if he had 
a bad leg. 
"Q. Is that when he got the blue slip? 
"A. Yes." 
It appears from the deposition that the decedent 
had been in good health prior to the accident in question 
since "We would go out fishing and the like. We would 
go out fishing and hiking around." (Appellant's depo-
sition, Page 15, Lines 6 and 9.) 
To summarizP appellant's testimony regarding the 
nature and extent of the injury, it appears that the de-
cedent suffered a cut approximately two and one-half 
inches long and from one-half to three-quarters of an 
inch deep on one leg. Whether he worked on Tuesday, 
W PdnPsday and Thursday of the week this injury was 
sustained is immaterial. On Friday, he felt sufficiently 
well so that he dressed himself and went to work. Upon 
n•porting for work, he was advised that he was dis-
15 
charged and given his separation notice rt>ferred to in 
the d<>position as a "blue slip.'' 'l'herenpon, dececknt 
rdurned home, took himself to his bed until such time 
as he could qualify to get on the welfare rolls and subs0-
quently, reported to tlw County Hospital as a wP!fan• 
patient for treatment. 
Upon such state of the evidence, the Court is askPd 
to believe that this injury of a type and severity such as 
might have been readily treated with a bandaid com-
pletely incapacitated and disabled the decedent, making 
it impossible for him to engage in any occupation for 
compensation or profit from the 26th of April contin-
uously until the first day of July, at which tinw he 
died. The respondent respectfully submits that such vi0w 
of the evidence is absolutely incredulous. Reasonable 
minds could not differ that such injury as is described 
in detail in appellant's deposition could not haw re-
sulted in total disability for such an extended period of 
time. This view of the evidence coincide with the de-
ceased's own conduct. Four days after the injur>', he 
felt sufficiently recovered to dress himself and report 
for work. Obviously, the deceased did not consider him-
self totally disabled on Friday, April 26, 1963, thP day 
he was discharged. Neither did Larry Blake, the Per-
sonnel Manager at Ajax Presses, who twice visited tlw 
Bench home, as set forth in Mr. Blake's affidavit (R. 56-
57). Appellant now asks this Court, in the face of such 
evidence and the behavior of the deceased himself, to 
hold that on Friday, April 26, the decedent ·was totally 
disabled. 
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This Court has many times considered the scope of 
n~vif~W npon an appeal from granting a summary judg-
n1ent. Apparently, the last of such cases is that of Jose 
F. ill onto ya vs. Berthana Investment Corporation, ct al, 
DECIDED April 17, 19GS, 'dwrein this Court, upon 
reviewing the pleadings, states 
''These were allegations - not proof. By em-
ploying the discover:r process under the rules, 
by affidavit and interrogatories directed to each 
party by the other, there developed a clear de-
parture from pleading and proof, that precipi-
tated no genuine issue of fact, but one of law 
based on the evidence submitted by both parties 
before trial." 
A summary judgment of dismissal was affirmed. 
The burden of the cases would appear to be that the 
state of evidence must be such from pleadings, deposi-
tions, affidavits, and any other evidentiary matters be-
fore the trial court, that reasonable minds might not 
differ as to the conclusion which would be reached. For, 
as said in Whitman vs. W. T. Grant Company, 16 U.2d 
Sl, 395 P.2d 918, 
"vV e are not persuaded that the trial court was 
in error in concluding that all reasonable minds 
would agree * * *." 
Or, as stated in Thompson vs. Ford Motor Company, 
1 G U.2d 30, 395 P.2d 62, 
"Therefore, if there is any reasonable basis in 
the evidence upon which n:asonable minds could 
conclude that they are not so persuaded on either 
of these issues, they should be submitted to trial 
by jury * * *." (Emphasis added.) 
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As statPd conversely in the case of Robison 1 ·'· 
RolJison, 16 C2d 2, 394 P.2d SIG, 
"It is our opinion that these are questions about 
which there is sufficient uncertainfr that reaso11-
ablc minds might differ cu; to their conclusion, 
thereo11. It follows that the plaintiff should lw 
afforded the opportunity he seeks of presenting 
the disputed issuPs in the case to a jury for 
determination." (Emphasis added.) 
It is clear from this Court's decisions that the plead-
ings alone are not sufficient to raise an issue of fact in 
opposition to affidavits or depositions. Continental Bank 
& Trust Company i·s. Cu11ningham, 10 U.2d 329, 353 P.2d 
168; Dupler i:s. Yates, 10 U.2d 251, 351 P.2d 624. 
It is also necessary that there be a ge1rnine issue of 
a material fact. In re Williams' Estates, 10 U.2d 83, 
348 P.2d 683; Bullock i:s. Descret Dodge Truck Center, 
Inc., 11 U.2d 1, 354 P.2d 559. 
Respondent respectfully submits that the evidence 
before the trial court, as shown by the record herein, pre-
sents a situation where reasonable minds could not differ 
on the question of the decedent's disability. The affi-
davit of Larry Blake, together with the appellant's own 
deposition, clearly overcome the allegations of the plead-
ings and show beyond hope of refutation that the de-
cedent 'vas not and could not be claimed as being totall:· 
disabled on the day he was discharged from employment. 
Whether he thereupon took himself to his bed and n·-
18 
lllained there until some later date is immaterial. He 
mnst have been continuously disabled from the date of 
hiti termination to the date of his death. 
Appellant cites several cases on the question of de-
nial of liability by an insurance carrier as constituting 
a waiver of the requirement that a proof of loss be sub-
1J1itted. Until the filing of the answer to appellant's 
original complaint, the record contains no denial of lia-
bility by the respondent. In each of the cases cited, 
there was no question that the insurance carrier was 
notified of a loss and through conduct of its agents or 
employees, either lead the claimant to believe that there 
was no necessity for further action and that the claim 
1rnuld be processed in due course or categorically denied 
liability and advised the claimant that there was no 
need to submit proof of loss. With the rule of law that 
such conduct is a waiver of the requirement that a proof 
of loss be submitted, respondent has no quarrel. 
The only evidence in this record of any notice given 
b~, the appellant of a claim under the policies is con-
taim'd in answers to interrogatories, Answer Number 6, 
"I was a\Yare of some insurance during Mr. 
Bench's life. Following his death, I corresponded 
with Ajax Press Company, Equitable Life Insur-
ance Company, and the Utah State Insurance 
Commission." (Emphasis added.) 
Answer Number 8 in response to the question, 
"On what date did you notify the defendant of 
)'our claim under such policies~ 
"Within a week after the death of Mr. Bench." 
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It should be noted that appellant has never specified 
to whom such ''correspondence" was addressed and if 
' in fact, the same was addressed to the Equitable Life 
Insurance Company, it was no doubt delivered to that 
company and not received by this respondent. The appel-
lant, as revealed by the record, has been very reluctant 
to divulge any information to respondent. We call the 
Court's attention to the fact that in order to securP 
answers to the interrogatories and to secure the signing 
and filing of appellant's deposition, it was necessary for 
the respondent to file a motion for dismissal based on 
failure to sign and file the deposition and to answer the 
interrogatories. (R. 26). At the time this motion was 
filed, it had been more than one year since the deposi-
tion was taken and the interrogatories submitted. The 
answers were filed the day before the hearing on the 
motion and the deposition signed and filed sometime after 
that. 
The respondent submits that there is no evidence 
before the Court either as to notice of a claim given to 
respondent or as to a denial of liability prior to the 
filing of this action, either on Policy 0486A or any of 
the other policies involved in this matter. Respondent 
further submits that regardless of this defense, as shown 
by the evidence and pleadings herein, respondent has a 
good and valid defense to each count of the appellant's 
second amended complaint and, therefore, the issue as 
to the giving of notice or denial of liability is not a genu-
ine issue of a material fact. 
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POINT IV 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, COUNTS III AND IV OF THE 
COMPLAINT FAIL TO STATE A CAUSE OF AC-
TION. 
~'he second amended complaint alleges in Counts III 
and I\' in almost identical language the existence of a 
policy of hispitalization and medical coverage being Pol-
icy 0846H and a disability policy being 0846W. Copies of 
these policies were produced pursuant to Paragraph 6 of 
the lower court's pretrial order on June 15, 1967 (R. 43) 
and are part of the file. These policies are exceedingly 
bulky since there are attached various provisions cover-
ing t>pecific divisions of the group which were insured 
and provided varying and different benefits for the dif-
ferent insured groups of employees. As set forth in the 
ap1wllant's brief, it is the respondent's position that 
claims under both of these policies are barred for failure 
to comply with the limitation requirements contained 
therein. The surgical and hospital policy provides that 
proof and notice of claim must be presented within 
ninety (90) days after the period of hospitalization, con-
finement or surgical operation (p. 42). The disability 
policy provides that proof must be submitted within 
ninety (90) days (p. 12). References are to written 
numbers appearing at the bottom of the photographic 
copies of the policy pages. 
Aside, however, from the question of limitations, it 
is and has been the respondent's position from the outset 
that the terms of these policies expressly exclude the 
daim urged by appellant. Refoning to Policy 0846H (all 
l'Pforences being to the handwritten numbers at the bot-
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tom of each page of the photographic copies), Pages 32 
through 38, inclusive, contain limitation provisiom; with 
respect to hospital and surgical benefits for variou~ 
classes of insured employees. In each instance and on 
each of the pages referred to is the provision that no 
payment shall be made for hospital benefits or surgical 
benefits incurred due to accidental bodily injuries arising . 
out of and in the course of employee's employment. Simi-
lar language appears at Pages 10 and 11 of Policy 0486W. 
Respondents, therefore, respectfully submits that the 
terms of the policies themselves exclude the claim now 
urged on behalf of the decedent who, according to Mrs. 
Bench's deposition, was injured on the job and such 
injury resulted in his disability and later hospital con-
finement and surgical procedures. Injury, disability and 
hospital confinement arising from such causes are simply 
excluded from the policy coverage and the employee 
would be left to his remedy under Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act. 
In addition, under Policy 0846H, by the terms of 
the policy itself, coverage is limited to amounts actitally 
incurred by the insured. At Page 32 is the provision 
that there may be paid, following proof of confinement 
to a hospital "the amount of charges for hospital room 
and board incurred during such hospital confinement 
* * *." With regard to surgical benefits, Page 36 con-
tains the language that payment will be made if there is 
proof of an operation having been performed "for surgi-
cal fees incurred for such operation." 
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'l'he appellant advances an interesting argument to 
the effect that respondent may not claim as a defense 
the fact that the decedent actually incurred no hospital 
and medical expenses and states that any recovery on 
this cause of action would be turned over to the Salt 
Lake County ~W l'lfare. Vv ere this a tort case, the fact 
that the appellant and her deceased husband had suffered 
no monetary loss might well be no defense to respondent. 
\Ve are here dealing, however, with a contract of insur-
ance which is clear, specific and not subject to any ambi-
guity. The contract simply does not cover any hospital 
confinement or surgical operation except charges actu-
ally incurred by the insured. 
CONCLUSION 
By way of conclusion and to summarize respondent's 
position: 
1. The Law and Motion Division of the lower court 
followed the Pretrial Order in ruling on respondent's 
Motion to Dismiss. 
2. Dismissal of the First Cause of Action was nec-
essary as a matter of law since all coverage lapsed on 
the thirty-first day following termination of employ-
ment. 
3. Dismissal of the Second Cause of Action was 
proper as there was no material issue of fact on which 
l'C'asonahlc minds might differ. 
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4. Dismissal of Counts III and IV of the second 1 
amended complaint as a matter of law was proper since , 
the policy provisions expressly exclude coverage of acci-
dents sustained in the course of employment and disabil-
ity resulting from sulch accidents. 
We respectfully urge that the Order of Dismissal 
with Prejudice entered by the lower court should be 
affirmed with costs to the respondent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Wallace D. Hurd of 
Bayle, Hurd and Lauchnor 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent 
1105 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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